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Translating to Communicate with Linguistic Minorities:
State obligations under international law
Gabriel González Núñez1
KU Leuven2

Abstract. In the on-going debate about language rights, the role of translation remains
somewhat of a blind spot. And yet, because there are very few truly monolingual societies in
the world, any language policy implies a translation policy. Translation policies will vary
from place to place, and they are often the result of ad hoc choices by policy makers at the
local level. Even so, by looking at international law, we can find a sort of lowest common
denominator for what is to be expected of translation policies. Sources of international law
that can have an effect in shaping domestic policies include treaties/conventions and the
judicial decisions of international tribunals. In Europe in particular, a number of regional
treaties from the Council of Europe weigh on translation as an instrument to guarantee the
rights of minority speakers. The European Union—with its own treaties, regulations, and
directives—also helps set minimum standards for domestic translation policies. We will see
that in Europe translation is usually cast as a means to secure other rights. Unfortunately,
international law seems to set a rather low bar for this, with the most explicit protections
afforded in the judicial realm but with relatively little elsewhere.
1. Introduction

The issue of language rights has come to the forefront in the last decades, as evidenced by the
literature on the subject and the political changes that have taken place granting greater rights
to minorities (many of which speak languages other than the majority language). As countries
adjust their language policies, many social, political, economic, and legal forces have come
into play. Of particular interest for the scope of this study are the legal forces that have helped
language policy evolve, especially when it comes to translation for linguistic minorities. Legal
developments within each state are affected by many factors, including what they see their
neighbours doing. Modern European states, for example, often compare their social policies,
including language and translation policies, against those of other states or seek to adopt what
they see as European social policies.3 Those common policies help drive international law,
1
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which in turn fosters developments in domestic law. Indeed, international law permeates
domestic law more and more. Consequently, when trying to understand domestic legal
developments, some aspects of international law may need to be taken into account. This is so
because international law offers a sort of legal common denominator for states, not just in
their interactions with each other but also in their domestic policies. Therefore, this study sets
out to answer the following question: Under existing international law, what translation must
take place in domestic policies? Because one of the aims of this study is to understand if
translation policies are intended to integrate linguistic minorities, we will be on the lookout
for any links between translation obligations under international law and issues of integration.
The question is relevant because it is linked to language rights, a topic that has not
gone unnoticed in international law. In this study, language rights are defined as those rights
that allow members of a language community to be free from state interference in the private
and public use of their own language and to be protected by the state in said use when it
comes to the full enjoyment of other rights provided by law. Under this definition, individuals
may have the right to use their language in private and in public (and to be attended in that
language by the state authorities), the right to have their children be educated in that language,
and other judicial rights which are guaranteed by law. The right to translation would be
derived from those language rights. To explore how translation can be construed as a
language right, we lean on Rubio-Marín distinction between instrumental and noninstrumental language rights.4
Non-instrumental language rights are those granted because of the state’s underlying
ideology that a certain group is entitled to the protection and even promotion of its language.5
Thus, they reflect the state’s commitment “to help a certain collectivity achieve the goal of
protecting its language”.6 Translation may play a role in helping grant non-instrumental
language rights, particularly when a lot of material that is produced in the majority language
for the entire state must also be produced in the language of the collectivity in question. On
the other hand, instrumental language rights are those granted with the “aim at ensuring that
language is not an obstacle to the effective enjoyment of rights with a linguistic dimension, to
the meaningful participation in public institutions and democratic process, and to the
enjoyment of social and economic opportunities that require linguistic skill”.7 Of course,
4
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when the state grants instrumental language rights, it is to individuals who lack the necessary
proficiency in the language of the state to effectively enjoy another right. Instrumental
language rights can be granted through translation as a sort of accommodation when language
becomes an obstacle for the enjoyment of rights.
This distinction is a helpful analytical tool, because it can help us see whether
translation is intended to help individuals have greater access to the state and its services
(instrumental) or whether it is meant to promote one or more languages (non-instrumental).
To be fair, there may be overlapping between both types of rights. For example, a government
may decide to adopt a number of measures to promote a local language even though the
population speaks the majority language as well as the local language. This may result in noninstrumental language rights. However, if there are individuals who speak the local language
only and not the majority language, translation for them would be aimed at securing
instrumental language rights. For purposes of this study, we will consider what the main
objective is behind the granting language rights. If said rights are mostly intended to promote
a language, we will consider them non-instrumental. If they are mostly intended to remove
obstacles from the enjoyment of other rights, we will consider them instrumental. As we do
this, we will see that for the most part, the international community sees translation as a tool
for implementing instrumental language rights.

2. Translation as mandated by general international law

2.1 Two general principles: freedom of expression and equality/non-discrimination
Language rights that are pertinent to translation, in order to be meaningful to individuals,
must be realized through state policy. As explained above, that policy may be constrained by
obligations under international law. What we understand to be language rights under
international law, as found in the relevant instruments, often derive from freedom of
expression as well as equality and non-discrimination. These two principles are frequently
present in the texts of international legal instruments.
Regarding translation, the argument could be made that freedom of expression on the
one hand and equality and non-discrimination on the other would surely imply that a minority
language speaker can use the language of his or her choosing (and then the government would
have to translate) or that in order for the government to communicate with a minority
language speaker without discriminating against him or her, the government would have to
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use that speaker’s language (often through translation). Except that is not really what freedom
of expression and equality/non-discrimination imply in international law.
As De Varennes points out, freedom of expression guarantees the right to choice of
language in private matters only (i.e., in the non-governmental realm), and even that can be
restricted if the restriction is predicated upon a rational need and proportional to the aim that
needs to be achieved (such as public order, health, or morals).8 Therefore, under international
law, freedom of expression does not guarantee the right to have the authorities translate
materials into one’s own language.9 In essence, this freedom does not impose a restriction
upon the government’s choice of language for interacting with individuals.10
When international law talks about equality and non-discrimination, it refers to being
equal before the law. Legal equality does not mean that everyone has to be treated exactly the
same. There may indeed be a rational basis for a proportional, differential treatment. Under
legal equality, however, differential treatment cannot be based upon certain grounds, which
are restricted by law. It is common-place for human rights instruments, both general and
regional, to cite language as such an impermissible grounds for discrimination. Thus, “the
exclusive use of a single language constitutes differential treatment which may in some cases
be discriminatory”.11 As indicated above, a government can discriminate on the basis of
language if there is a rational basis for such discrimination and that discrimination is
proportionate.12 De Varennes identifies the following grounds that make it permissible for a
government to have language preferences: national unity, number of speakers and their
concentration, whether the language is spoken by citizens or non-citizens, practical
considerations related to limited resources, compensatory means to eliminate the effects of
historically oppressive practices, socio-cultural and religious considerations, legitimacy of the
goal sought after, and proportionality of the goal to the means employed.13 What this means is
8
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that based on equality and non-discrimination, a government has a very wide range of
discretion (or margin of appreciation) when selecting its language preferences, which is to
say, when implementing its language policy.
As the two preceding paragraphs show, the many calls for freedom of expression and
equality/non-discrimination that are found in international instruments do not per se mean that
governments must translate for linguistic minorities. Therefore, we need to look at provisions
that more specifically call for translation. Narrow provisions that call upon governments to
translate for linguistic minorities are found in the Geneva Conventions, ILO Convention No.
169, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their
Families. We will now look at each one in turn.

2.2. 1949 Geneva Conventions
The Geneva Conventions are among the first instruments in international human rights law to
address the issue of translation for speakers of a language other than the government’s, albeit
in a very narrow context. The drafters of these documents were concerned with ameliorating
the horrors of war, not with integrating linguistic minorities, so the narrowness of the context
should not be surprising. Even though the Geneva Conventions apply to times of war and
occupation, they are interesting because they are high-profile treaties that include some
concern for translation. Further, some of the translation provisions found in these conventions
were later echoed in other, unrelated treaties and therefore expanded to situations of nonbelligerence.
The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Third14
Geneva Convention) very much concerns fairness in the treatment of prisoners of war. It is
rather conservative, however, when weighing in as to whether a fair treatment means
providing translations when needed. Translation is potentially called for in Articles 17, 41, 96,
105, and 107.
Article 17 reads simply: “The questioning of prisoners of war shall be carried out in a
language which they understand.” This article, which deals with the beginning of the
14
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prisoner’s captivity, implies the use of an interpreter if the prisoner does not understand the
language of his or her captors. The Commentary to the Convention signals that the
questioning need not take place in the prisoner’s first language, only in a language that he or
she will understand.15 Thus, there is no real concern for whether the prisoner has a right to use
his or her own language, but merely a practical consideration of being able to communicate
with the prisoner.
Article 41 in turn deals with measures during the internment of the prisoners. It calls
for the text of the Convention to be posted or distributed in the “the prisoners’ own language”.
This implies translation, but into what languages? The Commentary defines “the prisoner’s
own language” as “the official language of the prisoners’ country of origin”.16 Where more
than one language is official in a country of origin, the Convention should be posted “in the
language actually used by the prisoners concerned” if that language also happens to be an
official language in the prisoners’ country.17 The assumption seems to be that most, if not all,
prisoners will have enough of a grasp of their state’s official language(s) to read an
international treaty in that language. No thought seems to be given to prisoners who do not
meet that expectation. One must conclude that they either do not exist or do not matter.
Article 41 further calls for “Regulations, orders, notices and publications of every kind
relating to the conduct of prisoners of war” as well as “Every order and command” to be
issued in a language the prisoners understand.18 If the prisoners do not speak the language of
the captors, this can imply either an on-going language teaching effort or a sustained, regular
translation effort. For at least one delegate present at the drafting conference, the implication
was translation. During a committee meeting, a Turkish representative objected to having to
provide translations into many languages, particularly if the languages were lesser used
languages.19
The next three articles we will focus on deal with disciplinary and penal procedures.
Article 96 deals specifically with disciplinary actions against prisoners of war. It calls for a
prisoner of war accused of indiscipline to be informed of the accusation and to be allowed to
defend him or herself. In this process, the prisoner is “to have recourse, if necessary, to the
15
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services of a qualified interpreter”. Article 105, which deals with the prisoner’s right of
defence in a trial setting, indicates that the accused “if he deems necessary” may have the
assistance “of a competent interpreter”20 during the trail. The “Particulars of the charge” and
the “documents which are generally communicated to the accused” must be communicated to
the prisoner “in a language which he understands.” This implies translation in some situations,
even though not necessarily into the prisoner’s native language. Finally, Article 107 concerns
itself with the communicating of the sentence. It states that if the sentence was not
pronounced in the accused’s presence, it must be sent to him “in a language he understands”.
These three articles together reflect a concern with a general principle of law, that of a fair
trial for the accused. If the prisoner is going to have further limitations imposed upon his or
her liberty, then the prisoner needs to know what the accusation is, to have the ability to
defend him or herself, and to understand the outcome of the proceedings.
The Third Geneva Convention indicates that nations should have a policy of
procedural fairness toward captured enemies, particularly in disciplinary and trial settings, and
in certain circumstances, that policy can only be achieved through the use of translation. A
similar linguistic policy should be adopted toward civilians under military occupation,
according to articles 65, 71, 72, and 99 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention).
Article 65 mandates that the “penal provisions” of the occupying power must be
“published and brought to the knowledge of the inhabitants in their own language”. Here
again, the Commentary indicates that “their own language” is really the official language of
the occupied country, not necessarily the language spoken by the local populations.21 If the
country has several official languages, the publication should follow whatever was customary
in that place regarding the publication of laws before the occupation.22 The idea is that people
should not be judged according to unknown laws. Limiting translation activities to official
languages may be more than likely due to practical concerns. Indeed, concern was expressed
during the drafting conference that too much translation would be burdensome. Even so, there
seems to be also an assumption in this article that everyone that lives in a specific place

20
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speaks the official language of that place.23 This may not always be the case, particularly in
some rural communities and among immigrants.
Articles 71 and 72 deal with judicial procedures, and they both mirror Article 105 of
the Third Geneva Convention in regards to translation. Article 71 calls for prosecuted
individuals to be made aware of the charges “in a language which they understand”. Article
72 indicates that accused individuals will be assisted by an interpreter during preliminary
investigations and the actual hearings, unless such individuals “freely waive such assistance”.
They may also object to a particular interpreter and ask that he or she be replaced.
Article 99 deals with the treatment of internees and it mirrors Article 41 of the Third
Geneva Convention. Among other provisions, Article 99 calls for “[r]egulations, orders,
notices and publications […] to be communicated to the internees and posted inside the places
of internment, in a language which they understand.” Similarly, orders to individual internees
must be issued “in a language which they understand”. When there are language differences,
this calls for bilingual staff or translation, or a mixture of both. This article stresses that
“internees” must have access to a copy of the Convention in a language they can understand.
The Commentary indicates that in this context, internees usually will understand the official
language of the country where they are detained, but if not, translations into “foreign”
languages must be provided as needed.24
Because they deal with conduct in times of war, the Geneva Conventions are narrow
in their linguistic applications. Even so, they reflect principles of fairness, particularly when it
comes to judicial and penal procedures. The drafters of the Geneva Conventions understood
that if someone stood before a tribunal who did not speak the language of the tribunal,
proceeding without some form of translation would be unfair. Thus, linguistic protections are
called for. These are not triggered by the defendant’s nationality or linguistic preference, but
rather by his or her inability to understand the proceedings (or laws, rules and orders). The
linguistic protections found in the Geneva Conventions, which at times can only be achieved
through translation, are so obvious that they are found under international law in areas far
removed from the horrors of war.

2.3. 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

23
24

8

J. de Preux, supra note 15, p. 430.
J. de Preux, supra note 15, p. 430⎼431.

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) is one of three documents
that are considered to be the International Bill of Rights.25 The obligations set forth in the
ICCPR are monitored by the Human Rights Committee (HRC), to which all parties are
required to self-report. States are permitted to file complaints before the HRC, and individuals
from states parties to the first Optional Protocol can also file complaints. Thus, the HRC
serves as a forum of redress, even though it is not strictly speaking a tribunal. Even so, the
HRC’s General Comments to the ICCPR are authoritative interpretations (Scheinin 2008: 24).
The ICCPR reflects the same concern for fairness in judicial proceedings as the
Geneva Conventions, particularly as seen in Articles 105 and 106 of the Third Geneva
Convention. The ICCPR’s Article 14 refers to criminal proceedings. Among the “minimum
guarantees” outlined in 14.3, we find that everyone is entitled “(a) To be informed promptly
and in detail in a language which he understands of the nature and cause of the charge against
him”. It should be noted that, much like with the Geneva Conventions, “a language which he
understands” is not necessarily the accused person’s native language. This was settled in
Guesdon v. France, where the HRC signalled that the requirement for the assistance of an
interpreter in court proceedings applies only when the accused is not “capable of expressing
himself adequately in the official language” and should not be construed as a right to choose
the accused’s native language if he or she can speak the “official language”.26 Regarding
interpreting, Article 14.3 further indicates that everyone is entitled “(f) To have the free
assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.” The
HCR has clarified that this right to a free interpreter applies to nationals and non-nationals and
is not contingent upon the trial’s outcome.27 This right, however, does not extend to noncriminal court proceedings.28
At most, that is all the ICCPR stands for: the right to translation in criminal
proceedings. As will be seen below, subsequent instruments will expand this, but not very
broadly. Basically, very few international instruments call for translation beyond the context

25
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of criminal proceedings.29 In fact, several of the instruments that followed the ICCPR limited
themselves to reiterating this narrow right to translation.30

2.4. 1989 ILO Convention (No. 169) concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in
Independent Countries
The International Labour Organization Convention (No. 169) concerning Indigenous and
Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (Convention 169) is the major international
instrument dealing with the rights of indigenous peoples.31 Compared to the ICCPR, the rights
to translation found in Convention 169 are both narrower in applicability and broader in
scope. They are narrower in terms of who they apply to. Convention 169 applies to
“indigenous peoples”, a term that is vaguely defined in Article 1, thus leaving the task of
identifying specific groups to each state party to the Convention. Article 1 clearly indicates
that the protections in the Convention apply only to individuals who belong to an indigenous
group. To those who do belong to such groups, the right to translation is broader than under
the ICCPR.
Articles 12 deals with proceedings where the protection of the peoples’ rights may be
at issue: “Measures shall be taken to ensure that members of these peoples can understand and
be understood in legal proceedings, where necessary through the provision of interpretation or
by other effective means.” At first brush this may seem to echo the rights in the ICCPR, but
this is much broader. Article 12 effectively refers to all legal proceedings, not just criminal
proceedings. Under this Article, the availability of interpreting in legal proceedings is not
merely a matter of fairness. It is specifically a tool to allow indigenous peoples to protect their
rights by being able to effectively “take legal proceedings”. The assumption behind this right
to translation is that indigenous peoples are often unable to communicate in the language of

29
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their state’s legal system.32 Thus, if they are to stand before a tribunal to look for the
protection of their rights, they may need translation.
Article 30 calls for letting indigenous peoples know what their rights are under
Convention 169. According to this article, the right should be made known in a culturally
sensitive way, and if needed, “by means of written translations” and mass communication in
indigenous languages.
Thus, when taking Articles 12 and 30 into account, Convention 169 views translation
as a means to securing rights—not specifically language rights, but a much broader set of
rights regarding “labour, economic opportunities, education and health matters [and] social
welfare” (Art. 30). Translation is intended to play a role in informing indigenous peoples
regarding their rights but also in granting access to those rights. Consequently, translation is
viewed as a means to obtaining greater rights in society without forsaking any cultural
distinctiveness, including language. This is a much broader approach than that found in the
ICCPR.

2.5. 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers
and Members of their Families
The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and
Members of their Families (ICRMW) is a United Nations treaty aimed at protecting the
human rights of migrants.33 The linguistic protections in the ICRMW may seem redundant,
especially in light of other treaties. However, they exist because they are intended to put
migrant workers and their families on equal footing with citizens on several grounds,
including the administration of justice.
Specifically, article 16 calls for the reasons behind a migrant’s arrest to be
communicated “in a language they [the workers] understand”. That article also indicates an
interpreter should be present during the subsequent, preliminary court proceedings “if they
[the workers] cannot understand or speak the language used” by the tribunal. In the case of
further criminal proceedings, migrant workers are guaranteed “the free assistance of an
interpreter if they cannot understand or speak the language used in court” under Article 18.
Finally, if a decision is made to remove the migrant from the receiving country, that decision
32
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(Geneva, 2003) p. 28.
33
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must be communicated “in a language they [the workers] understand”, according to Article
22. The decision to remove a migrant worker from the host nation-state is not necessarily a
determination in a criminal proceeding, so this right to notice of removal (which may imply
translation) may go beyond the ICCPR.
As can be seen from the brief look at the preceding instruments, general international
law imposes on states very few obligations to translate. Thus, many states throughout the
world can conclude their domestic translation policies are in compliance with international
law if they offer translation: 1) to prisoners of war and occupied civilian populations, under
specific circumstances mostly related to penal or disciplinary issues; 2) to nationals and nonnationals, during criminal proceedings (from the time when charges are presented to the
sentencing), free of charge; 3) to indigenous peoples, during all legal proceedings in order to
help them safeguard a broad set of rights; 4) to migrant workers, during criminal proceedings
and removal notification. These are rather specific instances. Except for the broader rights to
be secured for indigenous peoples, these obligations to translate are mostly grounded on
notions of fairness in judicial proceedings and not as a means to integrate linguistic
minorities.

3. Translation as mandated by European international law
3.1. A “common European umbrella”
Of course, European states are bound by general international law. And they also have
to comply with an ever-growing body of law that is specific to Europe, most notably through
the Council of Europe (CoE) and the European Union (EU). Because of its efforts to create a
common European policy on certain non-economic areas, the CoE has championed important
instruments for the protection of minorities, including linguistic minorities. This work takes
place alongside that of the EU. The EU’s nature is such that the economic life of the EU’s
member states is deeply affected by EU policies. As the EU has grown in size and scope, it
has taken on social issues as well. Thus, EU law often deals with socio-economic inclusion.34
And then there is the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which
does not create binding law but has issued a number of thematic Recommendations that

34
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provide guidance on how to implement international law.35 The Recommendations, while not
binding themselves, are considered persuasive interpretations for member states. 36 Taken
together, the CoE, the EU, and the OSCE provide ‘a common European umbrella with a set of
values […] that work towards protecting [the] identity of ethnic groups and their cultures.’37
This ‘common European umbrella’ covers issues relating to language, including
translation. Thus, in order to understand what is mandated by European international law, we
need to look at legal instruments advanced by the CoE and the EU, always in the light of any
relevant judicial decisions. The OSCE’s understanding of these obligations can shed further
light on the role of translation in Europe when it comes to linguistic minorities. Consequently,
we will explore international law that is specific to Europe in the following order: CoE
treaties,38 EU regulations and directives, and OSCE recommendations.

3.2. 1950 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) is a
CoE treaty that seeks to protect the human rights of individuals in Europe. Any individual
who feels his or her rights under the convention have been violated in one of the CoE’s
member states can look for a remedy before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).
The ECtHR, by adjudicating the matters before it, helps define and evolve the ECHR.
Article 5 of the ECHR guarantees freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention.39 In
that context, Article 5 calls for an individual who has been arrested to “be informed promptly,
in a language which he understands” of the reason for the arrest or any charges against him or
her. This implies translation if the person does not speak the language of the arresting
authority. While the language of Article 5 seems to imply this right applies only for arrests of
suspected criminals, the ECtHR in Van der Leer v. The Netherlands extended the right to be
informed of reasons for arrest beyond the criminal law realm into other types of detention,
including that of the mentally ill. Čonka v. Belgium’s finding is consistent in that individuals
arrested with the aim of removal from the state also have this right.
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Article 6 of the ECHR guarantees the right to a fair trial.40 Article 6 states that when
there is a criminal charge, the accused has the right “to be informed promptly, in a language
which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him” and
“to have the free41 assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language
used in court”. This right should not be read too broadly. Here is where the case law of the
ECtHR helps define the limits of the right. While in Kamasinski v. Austria, the HCtHR
concluded that the right to the assistance of an interpreter includes written material, not just
oral statements, the same case signals this is not an unlimited right to translation—an oral
explanation of the contents of a document will suffice if the explanation allows for the
effective participation of the accused. In Ucak v. the United Kingdom, the court further
clarified that not all materials have to be translated, only those necessary for the accused to be
able to defend him or herself. Ucak also stands for the proposition that the interpreter is not
formally required to be independent (e.g., the interpreter could be related to the accused) but
must nonetheless provide services that are not an obstacle to the fairness of the procedures.
That is not to say that any interpreter will do. According to Coban v. Spain, what matters is
that the accused understand the nature of the proceedings in a way that he or she can
participate in his or her defence. So any interpreter (regardless of formal qualifications) will
do if he or she can accomplish proceedings that are essentially fair. Cuscani v. the United
Kingdom signals, however, that ultimately the judge must guard the fairness of the
proceedings in terms of language assistance. Naturally, the judge must have a reason to think
the language assistance is inadequate, and the assumption seems to be that language
assistance is adequate unless otherwise indicated. Indeed, Kamasinski v. Austria signals that
the parties must put the judge on notice when there are problems with the adequacy of the
interpreting if the judge is to exercise some control over its quality. But even if the court is put
on notice that there are problems with the interpreting, according to Panasenko v. Portugal,
this duty to translate is fulfilled if the problems are not serious enough to jeopardize the
fairness of the procedure. Thus, the key concern is not the accused’s language rights but rather
fairness. This principle was declared in Isop v. Austria, when the ECtHR found that Article
6’s right to a fair trial does not imply the right of the accused to choose his or her language
but simply to be able to put forth his or her case. Brozicek v. Italy’s conclusion that there is no
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need for translation if the government can establish that the accused understands the
information being given him or her therefore should come as no surprise.
As in other international instruments, translation is seen in Article 6 as an
indispensable element when the accused does not speak the language of the court, because
fairness demands that he or she “understand and participate effectively in the proceedings”.42
This does not mean that the accused gets to choose the language.43 It is clear from the
jurisprudence that the general principle from which these rights emanate is not nondiscrimination or freedom of expression but rather procedural fairness. Thus, the ECHR
cannot be read to guarantee a right to communicate with public authorities in the language of
one’s choice.44
In essence, like the ICCPR and similar instruments of general international law, the
ECHR contains very limited language rights.45 In terms of translation, those rights are limited
to 1) the assistance of an interpreter at the time of arrest in order to explain the reasons for the
detention and 2) translation once trial proceedings have begun in order to permit the
participation of the accused in his or her defence. The next treaty we will consider breaks
away from this general tendency of imposing very narrow translation obligations on states.

3.3. 1992 European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages
The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (ECRML) is rather unique. The
first of its kind, it deals solely with the question of language.46 It calls for language measures
“in areas where universal instruments are very deficient”.47 In so doing, the ECRML focuses
on languages, not people, whether individually or collectively.48 This means that the ECRML
places obligations upon the states but no “legally enforceable rights49 for the minority
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language communities or for individual speakers of the protected languages”.50 This does not
mean the ECRML is not binding. The charter provides for a monitoring system based partially
on self-reporting, but there are no judicial or quasi-judicial remedies that can be sought after
by individuals,51 because, as stated above, the ECRML does not create rights as such. Because
of its self-reporting mechanism, the ECRML depends to a great extent on the willingness of
each state to comply.
Another feature of the ECRML worth mentioning is that it explicitly offers no
protection to new minority languages (also known as immigrant languages or community
languages).52 Thus, the charter “distinguishes between languages which have a territorial basis
and those which are not territorial”.53 According to the Explanatory Report, speakers of new
minority languages face unique challenges that are not addressed by the charter, so their
languages (usually non-European languages) are excluded from the ECRML (para. 11). This
is rather ironic, since the ECRML is not aimed at dealing with the challenges of speakers but
rather with issues pertaining to non-majority languages. The ECRML’s preamble states that
the protection of regional or minority languages “contributes to the maintenance and
development of Europe’s cultural wealth and traditions”. Thus, what is clearly implied by the
exclusion of new minority languages is that non-European languages have nothing to bring to
the table in terms of “Europe’s cultural wealth and traditions”. By excluding new minority
languages and protecting languages instead of people, the ECRML imposes state obligations
that are derived from the desire to protect minority languages (and not necessarily to grant
access to minority language speakers to other rights).54
Another striking feature is the ECRML’s structure as a menu of options that states can
sign on to.55 The advantage of offering such options is that the ECRML thus recognizes that
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each European state has its own unique linguistic and historic landscape.56 The disadvantage
is that these options in some cases are very hedged, which has permitted “states to meet the
requirements in a minimalist way, often legitimated by claiming that a provision was not
appropriate or that numbers did not justify a provision”.57 This possibility of a minimalist
approach has been criticized as having the potential to make the charter “ineffectual in
practice”.58
Part I includes some general provisions regarding definitions and practical
considerations, such as information to be included in the instrument of ratification. Part II
outlines the charter’s general objectives and principles. This part applies to all regional or
minority languages, as objectively defined in the ECRML itself, so the state does not get to
pick and choose which languages will benefit from this protection.59 Part III is a menu of
specific measures that can be implemented. These measures are divided into specific areas:
education, judicial authorities, administrative authorities and public service, media, cultural
activities and facilities, economic and social life, and exchanges across borders.60 Each state
that ratifies the charter61 must specify one or several languages for protection and then choose
a minimum of 35 paragraphs and subparagraphs from Part III for each such language.62 Thus,
the specific obligations in Part III of the charter do not apply across the board to all
autochthonous minority languages. Rather, the governments get to pick and choose which
language will be afforded what protections. In the ECRML, translation becomes relevant in
the articles dealing with judicial authorities (Art. 9) and administrative authorities and public
service (Art. 10). We will now look at each of these two articles.
Article 9, paragraph 1 applies to situations where an individual is brought before a
court whose language is not the individual’s first language. Like most obligations in the
charter, those found in Article 9.1 are heavily hedged—they only apply to courts in regions
where there are sufficient number of speakers of the non-official language and as long as they
56
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do not “hamper the proper administration of justice” (9.1). The article’s first paragraph has
separate subparagraphs for each of three types of courts: criminal courts, civil courts, and
administrative courts. In the case of criminal courts, the accused may choose to use his or her
language, present evidence in that language, and produce “on request” relevant documentation
in the accused’s language. To accomplish all of this, the charter stipulates “the use of
interpreters and translations involving no extra expense for the persons concerned” (9.1.a). In
the case of civil and administrative courts, the litigant may choose to use his or her language
(at no additional expense) and present documents and evidence in that language, “if necessary
by the use of interpreters and translations” (9.1.b/9.1.c). This obligation to translate in judicial
matters is much broader than that imposed by the right to translation in criminal matters only
as found in the ECHR and the ICCPR. The latter is based on the principle of procedural
fairness, which sees translation a practical necessity. The former is based upon the notion that
individuals have the right to use their own language, if they choose to, before any court,
including civil and administrative courts.
Article 9, paragraph 2 indicates that legal documents drafted in an autochthonous
minority language cannot be invalidated only because they are not drafted in the state’s
majority language. These documents can be invoked against third parties that do not speak the
language of the document, as long as “the contents of the document are made known” to that
third party. There is no way to achieve this without some sort of translation, even though
Article 9.2 does not mandate that the full document be translated, only that its contents be
made known to relevant parties who do not understand them.
Article 9, paragraph 3 places on states the obligation “to make available in the regional
or minority languages the most important national statutory texts and those relating
particularly to users of these languages” unless they have already been translated. According
to the Explanatory Report, this is to be achieved through “the translation of legislative texts
into regional or minority languages” (para. 99).
Article 10 is hedged by applying to areas where there is a sufficient number of
speakers of the minority language. The article has different subparagraphs, including one that
applies to administrative authorities, one that applies to local and regional authorities, and one
that applies to public services. Regarding administrative authorities, the state should allow for
the use of autochthonous minority languages in communicating with the authorities, both
orally and in writing, and for the dissemination of the more widely used administrative texts
and forms in the autochthonous language. Regarding local and regional authorities, the state
should allow for the use of the autochthonous language of the local or regional population
18

both within the local or regional government and to communicate with the population.
Regarding “public services provided by the administrative authorities or other persons acting
on their behalf” (10.3), the state should allow for the provision of those services in the
minority language. All of the above obligations may be fulfilled, among other measures
including the use of bilingual staff, through “translation or interpretation as may be required”
(10.4).
For speakers of languages that benefit from the full protection of the ECRML,
translation can become an important tool in facilitating their use of their language in
administrative, civil, and criminal proceedings, in drafting legally valid documents against
third parties, in having access to legislative and administrative texts, and in communicating
with public authorities, local and regional governments, and public service providers, such as
hospitals. However, we should remember that not all protections will be given to all
languages, and that even in the case of languages specified for protection, the obligations are
heavily hedged by considerations such as the number and concentration of speakers and the
practicality of implementing specific measures. In other words, the charter usually will only
benefit speakers of languages that are linked to a territory in sufficient numbers and, quite
candidly, with sufficient political power. Even so, the ECRML’s call for translation as a
means to ensure the use of autochthonous minority languages in a wide range of activities
involving the state is far broader than that found in other instruments, including those that
came after this charter.

3.4. 1995 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities
The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM) “is the first
modern pan-European convention aimed specifically at the protection of persons belonging to
national minorities and contains a number of articles related to linguistic rights”.63 It belongs
to a newer type of international treaties generally known as ‘framework conventions’. While
there is no one technical definition for a framework agreement, these are treaties that tackle a
problem by creating a framework of principles and procedures and then delegating much of
the actual regulating to future agreements.64 However, the FCNM itself provides “legally
binding guidance … [that] serves as an umbrella setting the general objectives and main
principles while allowing each party sufficient room to take national particularities into
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account”.65 Further, the FCNM is monitored mainly through self-reporting before an Advisory
Committee made up of independent experts.66 This means the implementation of the FCNM
depends squarely upon each nation state, and individuals have very little recourse if they feel
their rights under the convention have been violated.
In terms of content, the FCNM parallels the ICCPR in many aspects.67 But it has a
different scope than the ICCPR (and the ECHR) in that its obligations look specifically to the
protection of minorities, including linguistic minorities.68
One aspect where the FCNM parallels the ICCPR and the ECHR is in that in Article
10, paragraph 3, it binds states to ensure that individuals (belonging to minorities) in criminal
proceedings be informed of the charges against them in their own language, through the free
assistance of an interpreter if necessary.69 Article 10.3 also includes the right to free assistance
of an interpreter to situations where such assistance may be necessary to inform someone
(from a minority) of the reasons behind his or her arrest in a language that he or she
understands. The Explanatory Report candidly points out the limitations of this protection:
Article 10.3 “is based on certain provisions contained in Articles 5 and 6 of the European
Convention on Human Rights. It does not go beyond the safeguards contained in those
articles” (para. 67).
Where the FCNM does seem to reach beyond the ICCPR and the ECHR is in Article
10, paragraph 2. This paragraph calls for “the conditions which would make it possible to use
the minority language in relations between those persons and the administrative authorities”.
In other words, the FCNM calls upon states to allow communication with administrative
authorities in minority languages, something that could necessitate translation.70 The
obligation is heavily hedged, even for an international instrument: “In areas inhabited by
persons belonging to national minorities traditionally or in substantial numbers, if those
persons so request and where such a request corresponds to a real need, the Parties shall
endeavour to ensure, as far as possible, the conditions which would make it possible …” The
result is that once again we have a limited obligation, that is linked to specific territories and
sufficient number of speakers and the state’s political will. In essence, this means very little in
65
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terms of persuasion for a state to adopt a policy of allowing communication with the
authorities in a language other than the state’s language. Despite appearances to the contrary,
the FCNM really goes no further in this regard than other binding international instruments.

3.5. 2011 Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic
Violence
On May 11, 2011, the Council of Europe opened for signature a convention to prevent
violence against women and to prevent domestic violence. This treaty, which has not yet
entered into force, calls for translation in an area not mentioned in other treaties. If the
convention enters into force, its provisions will become part of European international law,
including articles 19 and 56.
Article 19 reads: “Parties shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to
ensure that victims [of violence against women or domestic violence] receive adequate and
timely information on available support services and legal measures in a language they
understand.” Here, translation is seen as a means to allow victims access to information
regarding legal and support services. This goes beyond the use of translation as a means to
ensure procedural fairness or to promote the use of specific languages in public spheres.
However, according to the Explanatory Report, the obligation in Article 19 could have its
limitations: it “does not oblige Parties to the Convention to offer information in any language
but to concentrate on the languages most widely spoken in their country”. The “languages
most widely spoken” in a particular state may include new minority languages, so that on its
face, the obligation is not tied to territorial languages. The Explanatory Report seems to
suggest that the obligation could be connected to the frequency of a language’s use. Of
course, this is a matter of interpretation that will have to be played out in individual states, at
least until further guidance is provided.
Article 56 echoes the ICCPR and ECHR in its concern for translation during judicial
proceedings. However, the focus in this convention is not on the accused but rather on the
victim. Article 56, paragraph 1, subparagraph h, calls for “providing victims with independent
and competent interpreters when victims are parties to proceedings or when they are
supplying evidence”. This article would turn the tables of the general fairness-in-court-forthe-accused approach and ask states to consider the rights of the victim. Translation, when
needed, would be a way to secure those rights.

3.6. EU Treaties
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From consideration of CoE treaties we now move on to EU law. We note as we do that we are
moving into more and more restricted geographical areas. We began with international law
from a general perspective and moved to international law in Europe, as legislated by the
CoE. Now we move into EU law, which only applies to European states that are members of
the EU. We are moving from the top down, from the more general legal regimes to the more
specific ones. In other words, the nation states that belong to the EU are bound by general
international law plus CoE treaties plus EU law, and we analyse accordingly.
As we venture into the EU, we first must point out that the treaties, the EU’s highest
law, do not concern themselves with the language regime or translation practices of member
states, not even in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,71 which under
the Treaty of Lisbon has “the same legal value as the Treaties”. (Art. 8).
However, they do deal with language issues as they pertain to fundamental community
freedoms, which of course can impact translation policies. The Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union contains several fundamental freedoms, including free movement of
persons (Arts. 45⎼48), the right of establishment (Arts. 49⎼54), and the freedom to provide
services (Arts. 55⎼62), and free movement of goods (Arts. 28⎼37). The first three
fundamental freedoms have language components but do not directly deal with translation
issues. Regarding the free movement of persons, the EU has adopted a policy of official
language education,72 which does not necessarily mean that EU member states should not
translate. In fact, under EU law language rights extended to nationals, including nationals who
belong to a linguistic minority, must be extended to speakers from other member states.73 This
does impact translation more directly, as will be seen below. Regarding the right of
establishment and freedom to provide services, member states may impose language
competence conditions on trades and professions, but these must be non-discriminatory and
proportionate to the desired ends.74 Again, translating for linguistic minorities does not come
across as an important issue in this regard.
Where translation issues are more readily apparent is in the free movement of goods.
This freedom implies a balancing act between facilitating trade among members states and
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safeguarding consumer protection.75 In that context, EU law often touches on translation
issues when it comes to the free movement of goods. This is evidenced in a number of ECJ
cases (e.g., Colim and Bigg’s) and directives (e.g., Directive 2000/13/EC). However, the
focus of this study is on translation as a way to grant language rights to linguistic minorities.
Consequently, we will exclude EU law dealing with translation issues not focused on the
rights of linguistic minorities, such as such as cross-border product labelling or the book
trade.
What becomes apparent from this very brief discussion of language issues in the
treaties of the EU is that at the treaty level, the translation policies of the member states is not
a major area of concern. This is despite the fact that the EU has a much stronger say in the
policies of its member states than other international institutions. In essence, member states
are more or less free to implement their own language policies, but the policies must be
compatible with EU law.76 To know exactly what that EU law is, we must look at secondary
EU legislation, which is subject to judicial review by the ECJ. There we find some guidelines
on translation for linguistic minorities. We will begin with framework decisions, where we
find scant calls for translation.

3.7. EU Framework Decisions
3.7.1. 2002 Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures
between Member States
This Framework Decision deals with translation out of concern for the rights of the accused.
The Framework Decision came about as a consequence of the free movement of persons
within the Union. It grew out of the perceived need to have a uniform procedure for arresting
individuals in another member state, in lieu of a patchwork of onerous extradition procedures.
Thus, it is concerned with establishing a level playing field in Europe, and not necessarily a
linguistically diverse playing field. As will be made clear when looking at Article 11,
linguistic diversity is taken as a given and no concern is expressed for promoting it.
Article 11, which deals with the rights of the person sought for arrest, involves
translation. The Article indicates that the requested person “shall have a right to be assisted
[…] by an interpreter in accordance with the national law of the executing Member State”.
The obligation to offer translation via an interpreter is hedged so as to be fulfilled according
to the laws already in existence in the state that will actually execute the arrest. The
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assumption seems to be that such a right is already granted at the national level. Obligations
certainly exist under other instruments of international law, such as the obligation to inform
the person being arrested of the charges against him or her in a language that the person can
understand.

3.8. EU Regulations

3.8.1. 1968 Regulation No. 1612/68 on freedom of movement for workers within the
Community
Another binding form of EU law is to be found in regulations. Due to the Union’s
competences focusing mainly on economic integration, EU regulations generally do not
concern themselves with translation issues, unless it has an EU institutional dimension77 or is
meant to facilitate cross-border cooperation.78 There are times, however, when economic
concerns and the language rights of individuals interact. Such is the case of Regulation No.
1612/68 of the Council of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement for workers within the
Community.
On its face, the Regulation itself does not seem to address issues of language and
translation. However, case law from the ECJ shows that there is a relationship between the
free movement of workers as legislated and translation. Specifically, Article 7, paragraph 2,
reads: “He [a worker who is a national of another member state] shall enjoy the same social
and tax advantages as national workers.” In Ministère Public v. Mutsch, the ECJ clarified that
language rights asserted before a court are a social advantage for purposes of the application
of this Regulation. More specifically, “a worker who is a national of one member state and
habitually resides in another member state be entitled to require that criminal proceedings
against him take place in a language other than the language normally used in proceedings
before the court which tries him if workers who are nationals of the host member state have
that right in the same circumstances” (para. 18, italics added). In essence, this decision means
that any language right given to workers who speak an autochthonous minority language
should be extended to foreign workers from another EU member state that speak that same
language.79 In Bickel and Franz, the ECJ expanded Mutsch by clarifying that such language
rights must also be extended to citizens of other EU member states in general, even if they are
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just passing by the locality. Taken together, Mutsch and Bickel and Franz stand for the
proposition that language rights provided domestically to speakers of a specific language
“must be extended on a non-discriminatory basis to nationals of other EC Member States”.80
For example, whatever language rights a German-speaking Italian has in South Tyrol are to be
extended to a German-speaking Austrian who happens to be in South Tyrol. The principle,
then, seems to be non-discrimination, not necessarily the integration of linguistic minorities.

3.8.2. 1972 Regulation (EEC) No. 574/72 laying down the procedure for implementing
Regulation (EEC) No. 1408/71 on the application of social security schemes to employed
persons, to self employed persons, to self-employed persons and to their families moving
within the Community
This regulation deals at length with the specific procedures to be implemented in situations
where workers move from one member state to another and claim social security benefits.
Article 48 indicates that when an institution makes a decision regarding social security claims,
the claimant must be made aware of the decisions “in his own language by means of a
summarized statement to which the aforesaid decisions shall be appended”. This requirement
that a summary of the decisions be provided in the claimant’s own language in some cases
can only be satisfied through translation. The requirement is congruent with a larger issue that
is relevant to translation, as is made clear in Farrauto vs. Bau-Berufsgenossenschaft. Even
though Regulation 574/72 is no at issue in Farrauto, the court does mention that regulation as
an example of the principle that legal certainty requires that courts see to it that the worker is
able to understand the notifications of the decisions taken by the court. Thus, when dealing
with workers from other member states, some form of translation may be necessary for court
decisions outside of the criminal realm. Otherwise, a climate of legal uncertainty would
follow. Note that the concern here is legal certainty, not necessarily the language rights of
minorities.

3.9. EU Directives

3.9.1. 2001 Directive 2001/55/EC on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in
the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of
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efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences
thereof
This directive is one of several legislative measures adopted in the slow march toward a
common EU asylum system. Instruments pertaining to asylum would expectedly include
obligations to translate in the interest of fairness. Directive 2001/55/EC concerns measures
and procedures to grant temporary protection to individuals who enter an EU country as part
of a massive influx of displaced persons (such those displaced by the conflict in the former
Yugoslavia). Individuals granted such temporary protection must be given “a document, in a
language likely to be understood by them, in which the provisions relating to temporary
protection and which are relevant to them are clearly set out” (Art. 9). This could imply some
sort of translation effort, except that states are not required to provide the document in a
language the person actually understands. Consequently, the obligation to translate in this
instrument is weak in that the state is left with wide discretion as to what languages the
documents should be in.

3.9.2. 2005 Directive 2005/85/EC on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for
granting and withdrawing refugee status
This directive is also part of the effort to create a common EU asylum system. Under it,
individuals applying for asylum status are guaranteed that they will “be informed in a
language which they may reasonably be supposed to understand of the procedure to be
followed and of their rights and obligations during the procedure and the possible
consequences of not complying with their obligations and not cooperating with the
authorities” (Art. 10(a)). When the applicant is before the competent authorities, the free
assistance of an interpreter must be provided if “appropriate communication cannot be
ensured without such [interpreting] services” (Art. 10(1)(b)). This interpreter must be
competent, but he or she need not interpret into the applicant’s preferred language if there is
another language in which the applicant can communicate appropriately (Art. 13(3)(b)).
States, additionally, may provide written translations of documents relevant to the application
for asylum (Art. 8). Thus, the directive shows a strong concern for fairness in legal settings, a
trait derived from instruments of general international law, such as the Geneva Conventions
and the ICCPR.

3.9.3. 2008 Directive 2008/115/EC on common standards and procedures in Member States
for returning illegally staying third-country nationals
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Directive 2008/115/EC is also part of the effort to create a common EU asylum system. The
directive focuses on the removal of “illegal migrants” (Art. 12(3)) from non-EU countries.
Among the procedural safeguards called for in the directive, decisions regarding the entry,
removal, and return of the non-EU national must be issued, if requested, through “a written or
oral translation” into a language he or she “understands or may reasonably be presumed to
understand" (Art. 12(2)). Member states are also required to “make available generalised
information sheets explaining the main elements of the standard form in at least five of those
languages which are most frequently used or understood by illegal migrants entering the
Member State concerned” (Art. 12(3)). The concern here is once again fairness, specifically,
procedural fairness.

3.9.4. 2010 Directive 2010/64/EU on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal
proceedings
In terms of EU directives, the issue of translation features rather prominently in Directive
2010/64/EU, which deals specifically with translation in criminal proceedings. The drafters of
this Directive sought to facilitate a common implementation of translation as a tool to secure
the right to a fair trial, especially as found in the ECHR and the ECtHR’s interpretations of
that right (Directive, Preamble, recital 15). In essence, the directive “to some extent”
consolidates the findings of the ECtHR regarding this right.81 Articles 2, 3, and 4 are of
particular interest.
Article 2 deals with the right to interpreting. It calls for interpreting, if needed, “during
criminal proceedings before investigative and judicial authorities, including during police
questioning, all court hearings and any necessary interim hearings” (para. 1). Interpreting
must also be provided between the accused and his or her attorney “in direct connection with
any questioning or hearing during the proceedings or with the lodging of an appeal or other
procedural applications” (para. 2). Article 2 also deals with the right to challenge the decision
by the court that no interpreter is needed (para. 4) or to challenge the effectiveness of an
interpreter once one has been assigned, if the interpreting jeopardizes “the fairness of the
proceedings” (para. 5). Paragraphs 4 and 5 do not jeopardize the ECtHR notion that the judge
is the ultimate guardian of the fairness of the proceedings, including issues that may arise out
of language differences. However, the paragraphs do request the implementation of
81
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procedures to challenge a situation where the accused feels at such a linguistic disadvantage
that the right to a fair trial is jeopardized.
Article 3 deals with the right to translation of essential documents. Article 3 requires
EU members to provide “written translation of all documents which are essential to ensure
that they [the accused] are able to exercise their right of defence and to safeguard the fairness
of the proceedings” (para. 1). Such “written translations”, however, need not be in writing. An
oral summary may suffice (para. 7). Authorities in the proceeding are to decide which
documents are essential (para. 3) based on specific criteria (para. 2). Even in documents
deemed essential, passages “which are not relevant for the purposes of enabling suspected or
accused persons to have knowledge of the case against them” need not be translated (para. 4).
Much like in the previous article, Article 3 deals with the right to challenge the decision by
the court that no translation of a specific document or passage is needed or to challenge the
effectiveness of a translation that jeopardizes “the fairness of the proceedings” (para. 5).
Articles 2 and 3 also deal with the European arrest warrant. Article 2 calls for the
services of an interpreter when people subject to the execution of a European warrant “do not
speak or understand the language of the proceedings” (para. 7). Article 3 calls for the warrant
to be translated if the person subject to the proceedings “does not understand the language in
which the European arrest warrant is drawn up, or into which it has been translated by the
issuing Member State” (para. 8). This makes the obligation to translate in the context of a
European warrant stronger than had been mandated by the 2002 Framework Decision on the
European arrest warrant.
Article 4 states that the translation (including interpreting) is free to the accused,
regardless of the proceeding’s outcome.

3.9.5. Directive 2011/36/EU on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and
protecting its victims
The growing concern for victims under international law is reflected in EU law through this
and other directives. This directive is a legal instrument that furthers the EU’s commitment to
preventing human trafficking and protecting the victims of such trafficking. Victims of human
trafficking are particularly vulnerable for several reasons, including the fact that they are far
from home and often in a place where the language spoken by the majority is not their own.
The directive addresses that point by calling for measures of support that go beyond providing
translation if they are party to a trial. Article 10 calls upon member states to support the
victims through measures “such as […] translation and interpreting services where
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appropriate” (para. 5). Here, a duty to translate is imposed upon member states in order to
help strengthen the victim. The goal is not necessarily to integrate the victim, but rather to
allow her (victims of human trafficking are very often female) to heal by giving her access to
a number of services, including counselling and information.
3.9.6. Directive 2012/13/EU on the right to information in criminal proceedings
The EU is concerned with fairness in trial settings and is consequently moving toward a set of
minimum standards in criminal proceedings.82 Of course, there are a number of general
international instruments and European instruments that establish such minimum standards
(see above), but the EU seeks to provide common rules for its member states in implementing
those and other standards. To that end, there are currently three directives, either proposed or
adopted, aimed at creating uniform rules that will increase confidence in the reality of fair
criminal trials throughout the EU.83 The first such directive, Directive 2010/64/EU, is
discussed above. Directive 2012/13/EU is also part of that effort and is discussed now. It too
has some relevance in terms of translation.
This directive calls for accused persons to have the right to information in criminal
proceedings and in the execution of a European arrest warrant. Article 3 indicates that
“suspects or accused persons” (para. 1) must be given prompt information regarding their
procedural rights, including “the right to interpretation and translation”84 (para. (1)(d)).
Article 4 states that anyone who is arrested or detained must promptly receive a letter of
rights, listing specific rights (para. 1). This letter of rights must be provided in a language the
suspected or accused person understands (para. 5). If there is no written translation available,
an oral explanation must be provided in a language the person understands, but even so, a
written translation must be provided “without undue delay” (para. 4). In practice, this will
mean that arresting agencies will have to obtain translations of their letters of rights, either
before or after the arrest.
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This directive and Directive 2010/64/EU are presented as part of a broader strategy “to
achieve a full set of procedural rights and establish a solid common level playing field
throughout the European judicial area”.85 As is the case with other international instruments,
the concern here is not so much a desire to integrate linguistic minorities into the institutional
life of the state as it is to make sure that all citizens, regardless of what languages they speak,
are afforded procedural rights.

3.9.7. Directive 2012/29/EU establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and
protection of victims of crime
This directive, alongside the yet-to-be ratified Convention on Preventing and Combating
Violence against Women and Domestic Violence and some other instruments, is evidence of a
growing commitment under international law in Europe for the use of translation as a means
to strengthen the position of victims of crimes, particularly violent crimes. Reflective of this
concern, Directive 2012/29/EU seeks to strengthen the rights of victims in the EU by laying
out a set of minimum standards for the rights, support, and protection of said victims. The
directive replaces the 2001 Council Framework Decision on the standing of victims in
criminal proceedings.86
Regarding translation, the directive calls for translation to be provided during the
victim’s questioning and in certain aspects of the pertinent judicial proceedings. The victim
must be provided with free translation
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“during questioning of the victim and in order to enable them to participate actively in
court hearings, in accordance with the role of the victim in the relevant criminal justice
system. For other aspects of criminal proceedings, the need for interpretation and
translation can vary depending on specific issues, the role of the victim in the relevant
criminal justice system and his or her involvement in proceedings and any specific
rights they have. As such, interpretation and translation for these other cases need only
be provided to the extent necessary for victims to exercise their rights.” (recital 34).
More specifically, Article 3 calls on member states to “take appropriate measures to
assist victims to understand and to be understood from the first contact and during any further
necessary interaction they have with a competent authority in the context of criminal
proceedings” (para. (1)). When the victim cannot understand or speak the language of the
state, translation becomes a tool to enable compliance with this article. Further, under Article
4, victims are to be offered information regarding how to access their rights under this
directive, including “how and under what conditions they are entitled to interpretation and
translation” (para. (1)(e)).
Article 5 allows victims who do not speak or understand the language of the
authorities to make a complaint of a criminal offence “in a language that they understand or
by receiving the necessary linguistic assistance” (para. (2)) and to receive “written
acknowledgement of their complaint” through free translation (para. (3)). This is true to the
directive’s indication that victims who do not speak the language of the authorities, in order to
be fully enjoy their rights in the redress of the crime, must be provided with language
assistance, which often takes the form of translation.
Article 7 in its entirety deals with the issue of translation for victims that may need it.
The article indicates generally that victims who do not speak the language of the authorities
must be provided with interpretation, if they request it and
“in accordance with their role in the relevant criminal justice system in criminal
proceedings, free of charge, at least during any interviews or questioning of the victim
during criminal proceedings before investigative and judicial authorities, including
during police questioning, and interpretation for their active participation in court
hearings and any necessary interim hearings.” (para. 1).
They must also be provided with (written) translation of documents “essential to the exercise
of their rights in criminal proceedings” if requested, including at least “decision[s] ending the
criminal proceedings […] and upon the victim’s request, reasons or a brief summary of
reasons for such decision” (para. 3). Additionally, “victims who are entitled to information
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about the time and place of the trial” must receive that information through translation, if
needed (para. 4).
Under certain circumstances, this translation may take the form of an “oral translation
or oral summary of essential documents” (para. 6). Essential documents are those that are
“relevant for the purpose of enabling victims to actively participate in the criminal
proceedings” (para. 5). If the victim is denied translation, the draft calls for a mechanism to
challenge the decision (para. 7). There is a hedge to all this translation for victims:
“Interpretation and translation […] shall not unreasonably prolong the criminal proceedings”
(para. 8).
This use of translation is intended to allow the victim to exercise his or her rights. In
this regard, the right to translation becomes more than a way to assure procedural fairness for
the accused in a trial setting. In expanding the role of translation in judicial proceedings, it
follows in the footsteps of the Framework Decision on the standing of victims in criminal
proceedings and the Directive on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and
protecting its victims.
3.10. The OSCE’s HCNM Oslo Recommendations regarding the Linguistic Rights of National
Minorities
Having concluded our survey of binding international instruments that have a bearing on
European states’ obligation to translate, we now turn to the OSCE’s High Commissioner on
National Minorities’ thematic recommendations. As stated above, even though the
recommendations are not themselves binding, they are considered by some to be persuasive
interpretations of international obligations vis-à-vis minorities, including linguistic minorities,
for Europe. When looking at the obligation to translate, the 1998 Oslo Recommendations
Regarding the Linguistic Rights of National Minorities (Oslo Recommendations) are most
relevant.
The Oslo Recommendations come as the result of two expert consultations regarding
the linguistic rights of national minorities.87 The Recommendations draw on general
principles of law found, inter alias, in non-binding documents, such as the UN Declaration on
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the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities.88
They are also derived from international instruments that are legally binding on most OSCE
participating states.89 Because such instruments are often vague and general, the Oslo
Recommendations attempt “to develop these […] elements of international law into more
precise and detailed provisions which can guide language policies better than the general
international standards on which they are based”.90 This means that the Oslo
Recommendations become more than an interpretation of international law regarding
linguistic minorities. They “draw progressive inferences”91 in an attempt to move forward the
linguistic protection of minorities.92 In this regard, we can think of the recommendations as a
view of what European law should be.
The Oslo Recommendations touch upon the right to communicate with administrative
authorities in a language other than the national or official language. Recommendations 13
and 14 indicate that such a right should be granted where there are enough speakers of a
minority language and these speakers express their desire for such a right. Recommendation
13 suggests that “persons belonging to this national minority shall have the right to acquire
civil documents and certificates both in the official language or languages of the State and in
the language of the national minority in question from regional and/or local public
institutions”. In turn, Recommendation 14 suggests that linguistic minorities should have the
possibility of communicating with the administrative authorities and of receiving public
services in their own language. The broad proposition found in these two recommendations,
and also in Recommendation 15,93 is that the language of the minorities may be a vehicle for
communication with public authorities.94 It should be noted that translation is not mentioned
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as a way to carry out Recommendations 13 and 14. Yet if the state’s primary language is one
other than the language of the minority, translation becomes one of several tools95 to
achieving the stated aim.
Recommendations 17 and 18 focus on language rights when dealing with judicial
authorities. Article 17 echoes the very obvious international obligation to offer all persons the
free assistance of an interpreter when faced with arrest and detention, as well as “before trial,
during trial and on appeal” in order to mount a defence. Article 17 makes it clear that this is
not necessarily a right to interpreting into the accused person’s own language but rather a
right to interpreting into a language the accused understands. However, Article 18 signals that
if there are enough speakers in a certain locality and these speakers express such a desire,
accused persons “have the right to express themselves in their own language in judicial
proceedings, if necessary with the free assistance of an interpreter and/or translator”.
Recommendation 20 turns to the penal phase. It suggests that the staff working at
penal institutions should speak a language that the majority of the prisoners understand. If
needed, “the services of an interpreter shall be used”. This recommendation views translation
as a tool for effective communication between individuals deprived of liberty and their
captors. Much like in the Geneva Conventions, a concern for the principle of fairness is
evidenced in this Recommendation.
At this point we have concluded our survey of binding instruments (and their
authoritative interpretations) regarding the obligation to translate under international law.
Having an idea of what these international obligations are, we can now draw some
conclusions regarding when European states are required and are not required to translate
under international law.

4. Conclusion
We return to our initial question: “What translation must take place in domestic policies under
existing international law?” Broadly speaking, European states are required to translate in four
types of situations: 1) in times of war; 2) in judicial matters; 3) for communications with the
authorities; and 4) during the provision of public services. Enough has been said about the
duty to translate during times of war,96 so we will look at the other three categories.

95

Other tools may include the hiring and training of bilingual staff. But even here, said staff would presumably
engage in translation activities from time to time.
96
See section 2.2.

34

The most explicit obligations to translate under international law are to be found in
judicial matters, at least compared to other situations. This is particularly true in criminal
proceedings, from the time of the initial arrest all the way to the issuing of the sentence.
International law is quite influential in shaping this aspect of national translation policy,
particularly in Europe.97 Thus, the right of the accused to translation is found in most major
human rights instruments, such as the ICCPR, Convention 169, the ICPRMW, the FCNM,
and even the EU’s Directive 2010/64/EU. This right is also extended to victims in instruments
such as the directive establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of
victims of crime. It should be noted there is no right to translation into an individual’s native
language per se, but only into a language the person can understand. Most international
instruments shy away from extending these protections to other type of judicial proceedings,
including civil and administrative proceedings. However little this international obligation
extends beyond the criminal realm is the result of duties imposed by courts. As we analyse
these obligations, it seems apparent that the duty to translate in criminal proceedings is a
procedural safeguard aimed at securing the right to a fair trial, which includes the right to
mounting a defence.98 This same concern for procedural fairness is reflected in the obligations
to translate in proceedings that affect refugees, asylum seekers, or illegal migrants.
Procedural fairness in judicial settings is a desirable goal. When there are language
barriers, it helps foster equality by creating access to the judiciary for people who would
otherwise not have it. This is, of course, a form of integration of linguistic minorities, at least
of those who cannot speak the language of the court sufficiently well. It is a form of
integration because it allows greater contact and interaction between state institutions and
individuals who do not speak the language of the state. However, it is a modest form of
integration, as it only applies to specific types of procedures (usually criminal) in the rather
narrow context of the courts. The broader ways in which linguistic minorities could interact
with the state via translation are often overlooked in international law.
There are two major exceptions to the general observations in the previous paragraphs.
One is the rather exceptional ECRML. This charter calls for translation during criminal
proceedings into a limited amount of autochthonous minority languages, which languages are
specified by each ratifying state. It also provides for translation in non-criminal proceedings.
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The charter is unusual in that it is not aimed at securing rights for individuals but rather at
protecting a certain category of languages, namely the so-called ‘regional minority
languages’. The other instrument that extends the right to translation in judicial matters
beyond the criminal realm is Convention 169. Unlike the ECRML, the drafters of this
convention were indeed concerned with the rights of individuals, in this case those of
indigenous peoples. By extending the right to translation into non-criminal proceedings,
Convention 169 foresees a role for translation as a means to secure a broader set of rights.
When the rights of indigenous peoples are threatened by the majority, those peoples can rely
on translation for their day in court. In this light, translation becomes a tool for empowerment
against assimilation into the majority.
It is also appropriate to note that increasingly we find an awareness under international
law of the role that translation may play for victims of crimes99, not just during criminal
proceedings but also in other situations that are a result of their victimization. For victims,
translation becomes a tool for fairness in judicial proceedings and a way to secure other rights
pertinent to the proceedings. It also becomes a tool for access to services that may be
necessary to make the victim whole.
Regarding translation as a means to communicate with the authorities, only the
ECRML calls for those communications with the authorities to take place in a minority
language. The FCNM apparently does the same thing, but the obligation is heavily hedged.
The right to communicate with the authorities is rather weak in international law.100 Even so,
experts such as those that drafted the OSLO recommendation feel this is a direction states
should move toward, albeit with important limitations (such as number of speakers and
expressed desire), based on principles such as non-discrimination. Despite some consensus
among European nation states that members of minority groups should enjoy some rights to
communicate with the public authorities in their own language, the application of that
consensus is vague and weak at best.101 Translation would be one of several ways to apply
that weak consensus.102 However, what limited translation does currently take place in public
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institutions, especially when it comes to new minority languages, is not always mandated by
international instruments.103
Regarding translation in many types of public services, there is very little to make
states feel bound to engage in such a work. Both Convention 169 and Directive 2012/29/EU
call for translating certain documents for the benefit of different groups. But these obligations
are rather narrow, and the more common services, such as healthcare, are largely unaffected
by any obligation to translate. Only the ECRML and the FCNM call for language policies in
the public service sector to include the use of languages other than the central state’s
language.
This does not mean that states are not employing translation as a tool in their public
service provision. Out of necessity, they must to a certain extent.104 However, they are under
no explicit international law obligation to do so. Take, for example, Directive 2011/24/EU on
the application of patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare. While it is expected that crossborder healthcare issues include translation, Directive 2011/24/EU largely does not concern
itself with that. Article 4, which deals with the responsibilities of member states for treatment,
reads in paragraph 5: “This Directive shall not affect laws and regulations in Member States
on the use of languages. Member States may choose to deliver information in other languages
than those which are official languages in the Member State concerned.” This blunt statement
in Directive 2011/24/EU simply reinforces the notion that issues of language in healthcare are
not contemplated in international law.
The fact that states are under no specific international obligation to provide translation
in healthcare settings is particularly problematic. It is problematic because language barriers
can have a real impact on healthcare provision. There is evidence to indicate that language
barriers can limit access to healthcare.105 This linguistic challenge should not be
underestimated. Spolsky points to mistreatment, misdiagnosis, misprescriptions, and other
challenges as examples of the scope of the problem.106 Doctors and nurses are like lawyers,
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judges, and police officers in that they tend to be majority language speakers while their
patients are often in a high proportion speakers of minority languages.107 Even so, doctors
frequently expect friends or family (including children) of the patient to provide translation
when it is needed.108 The difficulties can have lethal consequences: it is estimated that in the
United States, 98,000 deaths could be avoided each year if labels on prescription medication
were translated from English.109
It is also problematic because states have generally not been keen to put the issue of
translation in healthcare on their legislative agendas. Of course, some states pressure
healthcare providers into using translation to address the issues mentioned in the previous
paragraph. For example, in the UK there is extensive non-discrimination legislation that
healthcare providers often see as triggering the need to translate. But not all states have
legislated in a way that healthcare providers feel the need to translate. At that point, the level
of translation provision becomes a matter of policy for each institution. Some healthcare
providers deal with the problems of multilingualism in structured, systematic ways. For
example, Intermountain Healthcare, a regional non-profit hospital and medical services
provider in the USA, employs 14 full-time interpreters, a host of contract interpreters, and
multilingual staff to provide medical services in over eighty languages.110 Even so, in many
places, provision of language support measures is not nearly as responsible. For example, in
hospitals in countries like Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy and Spain, it has been reported
that staff interpreters are not always available, and in some cases translation is improvised by
bringing in bilingual cleaning staff or even security personnel.111 Again, part of the reason
that no translation policies are adopted by these healthcare providers is the lack of national
legislation to compel the use of translation in healthcare settings.112 And international law
does next to nothing to pressure governments into taking action.113
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Issues of translation in public services, especially in healthcare, are often ignored in
international law, even in the face of a vague consensus that some sort of translation may be
appropriate in related matters, such as when communicating with authorities. This is the case
because the only place where translation is very strongly mandated and nourished by
international law is the judicial realm, especially in criminal proceedings. Such a safeguard
during criminal proceedings is desirable, but perhaps the time has come for international law
to take up the issue of translation in non-judicial settings more forcefully. After all, one is
more likely to walk into a hospital than a courthouse…
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regional or minority languages ought to “ensure that social care facilities such as hospitals […] offer the
possibility of receiving and treating in their own language persons using a regional or minority language”.
According to the Committee of Experts, this provision is not to be fulfilled via translation, because translation is
understood to be an insufficient means of communication between speakers of autochthonous minority
languages and healthcare staff, i.e., communication should take place in the autochthonous minority language
sans intermediaries. I. Urrutia Libarona, ‘Article 13. Economic and Social Life’, In A. Nogueira López, E. J.
Ruiz Vieytez and I. Urrutia Libarona (eds.), Shaping Language Rights: Commentary on the European Charter
for Regional or Minority Languages in Light of the Committee of Experts’ Evaluation (Council of Europe
Publishing, Strasbourg, 2012) p. 474.
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